The aim of the paper is twofold. First, we try to fill a theoretical gap in evolutionary economics by developing some key elements of an evolutionary theory of social stratification that explicitly link the generation of technological and institutional novelty to the structural evolution of social inequality; as central theoretical connection, an conception of social power as a relative ability to control the evolution of social surroundings is introduced. Second, building on the theoretical framework, we develop a scenario for the specific structural properties of "knowledge societies", where, contrary to the notions of seminal thinkers in evolutionary economics and important branches of sociology, an acceleration in technological and institutional change is integrally connected with a decrease in social mobility and a "hardening" of class differences.
Introduction
The wide array of technological, institutional, and organisational changes implied by the emergence of "knowledge economies" has profound implications for the patterns of social stratification in the affected societies. In particular, various key developments such as the expansion of competition in labor and capital to a global scale or the growing importance of mental skills in the workforce have sparked concerns about the emergence of a global political and economic élite that appears to be increasingly isolated from the rest of the population, resulting in serious problems of social cohesion as well as the -broadly conceived -"legitimacy" of inequality. While problems of this kind are regarded by many observers as a key variable to the viability of knowledge societies -and, in intimate connection, the process of globalisation in general -they appear to be only insufficiently addressed by economic theory. While the equilibrium-oriented orthodox approach does have a branch on income distribution (albeit in tendency still neglected), 3 it traditionally has little to say about the sources of technological change and therefore, for example, on the foundations of skill-revaluation processes in labor markets. On the other hand, evolutionary economics -at least its mainly "European" branch -up to now has largely sidestepped distributional problems and, in particular, the phenomenon of persistent inequality. The main reason for this is probably to be seen in the discipline's traditional focus on technical progress and the emergence of novelty. In our view, this omission from a theoretical point of view appears to be a serious one, for two main reasons: First, it can be conjectured that patterns of social stratification influence the rate and direction of technical progress in a relatively straightforward manner; this can happen, for instance, via hierarchical patterns of organisations, or differing structures of educational systems. While these topics are peripherically dealt with in the evolutionary economics literature, their crucial interconnection with "classical" issues of social stratification, in particular, social mobility, is almost never spelt out. Second, many papers in evolutionary economics implicitly assume a high rate of technological progress to be welfare-enhancing and therefore normatively desirable in principle. But this perspective again is too narrow: at least in the short run, innovations almost always cause social and economic descent of individuals or groups, 4 a problem that is aggravated from the welfare point of view by the fact that individuals' happiness, besides absolute material well-being, tends to depend on their relative social standings. 5 The viability of an economic system generating a high rate of innovation, then, crucially depends not only on its external competitiveness (which is supposedly high) but on the internal acceptance of inequality on behalf of its disadvantaged members. It is at this point that the problem of social mobility enters the picture: as long as the system remains structurally in flux and social mobility is high, stability is probable to be maintained by a sufficiently great part of people holding expectations of upward mobility. 6 A traditional empirical conjecture in sociology, 7 closely resembling the implicit evolutionary view, then holds that in industrial societies, a high rate of technological change, combined with competitive, "meritocratic" patterns of élite recruitment, guarantees mobility to remain high. Given that this conjecture (albeit contested in its own realm) is true for industrial societies, at first glance there does not seem to be any concern with élite formation in knowledge societies as these societies are generally assumed to be characterised by an even higher rate of technological progress and strucural change. But that might exactly be the problem: the increasing speed of change might lead to the polarization of an élite that is selected for the very ability to innovate and learn, and therefore tends to reinforce and speed up processes of change, and a broad population, viz., labor force, that by its general quality of human capital is no longer able to keep up with those changes and therefore tends to be excluded from vital sources of the structural dynamics. 8 In this scenario, a decrease of social mobility and an acceleration of structural change would ultimately be conditional on each other, eventually putting systemic stability in jeopardy.
The aim of the paper is twofold. First, we try to fill the outlined theoretical gap in evolutionary economics by sketching a general framework to integrate the analysis of novelty and structural change with the dynamics of social mobility. As the key connecting concept, we introduce a general notion of social power: structures of social power impact on the generation and diffusion of innovation; at the same time they constitute frameworks for processes of individual social descent and ascent. In the dynamic perspective, then, the evolution of power structures is itself influenced by the generation of institutional and technological novelty as well as by processes of social mobility. Second, and building on this, the outlined scenario for knowledge societies, while not validated in empirical detail, is to be put into theoretical perspective. 5 See already Easterlin 1974. 6 This topic is explicitly addressed by a relatively new branch of the rational-choice-literature (deemed "POUM", prospect of upward mobility hypothesis, by Benabou / Ok 2001; see there for further references). The seminal contribution in this context was Hirschman 1973 . 7 We refer here to the sociology of "industrialism", See for summarizing treatments e.g. Ericsson / Goldthorpe 1992, 3 ff., and Hradil 2001, 377 ff. 8 For a rare explicit articulation of that problem from an economist's point of view see Foray/Lundvall 1996, 24 ff. Sociological expositions pointing in this direction are more common, see e.g. Nelson 1995. The paper is organised as follows. To prepare the background, we present a very short exposition of main ideas of the key intellectual precursors and founders of evolutionary economics, v.Hayek, Schumpeter, and Veblen, in Section 2; while they under different perspectives deal with the relation between power structures and the patterns and speed of technological change, they tend to neglect the relation of these issues to the problem of social mobility. We then develop an evolutionarily founded concept of social power (Section 3) and the evolution of power structures given the continuous emergence of novelty (Section 4). In section 5, we establish the connection to the problem of social mobility. Finally, in section 6 we discuss the problem of élite formation in knowledge societies in the light of the theoretical exposition. A brief conclusion follows.
2. Power, structural change, and social mobility in the writings of v.Hayek, Schumpeter, Veblen: an exposition of some key ideas a) In F.A.v. Hayek's exposition of the significance of spontaneous order and its policy implications, social inequality appears as an unavoidable correlate of a viable market-based system. This is due to the decentral distribution of knowledge in an economy and, therefore, the impossibility to generate exact distributional results by a central political authority; the rise and fall of individuals or groups over time is in principle inevitable and unforeseeable.
9 Apart from the ubquitous presence of the fundamental knowledge problem, Hayek regards legal or administrative measures to equalize the income distribution as unacceptable for two main reasons: first, it is a consequence of the central (and democratically unmodifiable) moral postulate of individual freedom and equal treatment of all citizens before the law. 10 Second, interventionist measures of all kind, by distorting the spontaneous order, undermine the economic system's capacity to endogenously generate novelty and, therefore, to adapt successfully to competitive surroundings. 11 Hayek apparently does not regard issues of internal systemic stability by maintaining the legitimacy of inequality as very crucial -he merely asserts that the very unforeseeability of an individual's future social position will raise his or her acceptance of inequality compared to a situation where each individual's "merit" could unambiguously be assessed by a central authority.
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Referring to Young (1958) , Hayek mentions the prospect of the emergence of a meritocratic élite based on heritable cognitive capacity quite in accordance with his envisaged abstract principles but (perhaps revealingly) does not further inquire into the implications of this possibility. 9 See e.g. Hayek 1969, 258. 10 Compare for the refusal of any notion of "social justice" Hayek 1976, 62 ff. 11 Hayek 1969 , 144 ff. 12 Hayek 1960 Ibid., 387 f.
Hayek discusses the problem of power almost exclusively with regard to the necessary restriction of the competencies of the state and economic policy. Economic (that is, monopoly) power in general is to be seen as an acceptable result of spontaneous market processes and as such does not justify intervention. 14 b) In Hayek's thinking, structural change is crucially propagated by an "experimenting minority" that continuously undermines established positions and paves the way for the ascent of new individuals and groups. This, together with the readiness to accept (perhaps even advocate) the (at least temporary) formation of monopolies, makes him similar in spirit to Schumpeter's (1912) well-known account of the pioneering entrepreneur who "creatively destructs" old structures by continuously channeling technological novelty into the economic system. Drawing heavily on psychological categories, Schumpeter describes the entrepreneur as a particular type of character distinguished by a high level of intrinsic motivation and power to overcome established patterns of thought and social obstacles, as well as the capacity to draw the "right" decisions in an intutitive, and not necessarily intellectually well-founded, fashion.
15 As such, the entrepreneur has to be sharply distinguished from the "innovator" in the narrower sense, and the "capitalist" as owner of the means of production; contrary to those actors his role lies primarily in the generation of novelty on a social level and, therefore, in the creation of new (class) positions. 16 In his "Theory of Economic Development" Schumpeter discusses the implications of his perspective for the problem of social mobility only briefly and not entirely convincingly. 17 As a result of the incessant structural change he explicitly asssumes a continuous social reshuffling particularly in the upper segments of society -these resemble "inns always being fully occupied, but with ever changing people" 18 -theoretically relating to Pareto's theory of élites circulation. 19 At the same time, however, he postulates a more or less fixed distribution of entrepreneurial capacities in a (ethnically homogenous) population, which raises the question why structural change is not propelled continuously by the same narrow segment of people instead of generating social mobility.
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Only the later Schumpeter (1942) systematically combines the analysis of technological progress with (power-) structures of markets and enterprises. He argues that capitalist development leads into a routinization of innovative activity 14 See Hayek 1979, 128 ff. 15 Schumpeter 1912 Schumpeter /1987 Ibid., 111 ff. 17 A fuller acount of the social mobility problem can be found in Schumpeter 1927. There, however, the argument heavliy relies on a Marxist-inspired notion of "class structure" and does not systematically integrate the innovation aspect. 18 Schumpeter 1912 Schumpeter /1987 . 19 See e.g. Heertje 1988, 93 for this affinity. 20 This critique is e.g. pronounced in Witt 1987, 44 f. by a new class of specialists-experts and an accustomization to economic change on behalf of consumers. 21 Conversely, ultimately technological advance can only be upheld in a framework of large enterprises; a certain amount of monopolisation, viz., market power is therefore necessary to uphold economic progress and systemic competitiveness.
c) The relation between technological change and structures of economic power spelt out by Schumpeter (1942) is also central to Veblen's thinking, albeit under a quite different perspective -here processes of social stratification and the emergence of social barriers between classes figure center stage in the theory. Although the exact behavioral assumptions in Veblen's work appear somewhat ambiguous, 22 we do find a basic distinction between two components of human behavior on which the thrust of Veblen's theory of institutions builds upon: the "instinct of workmanship" and the "predatory impulse". 23 Each individual's behavioral patterns constitute a specific combination of the two elements which is decisively influenced by certain norms, viz., institutions, that are in turn differentiated by social class. An example for such a norm is "conspicuous consumption", which constitutes a pattern of status competition characteristic for the "leisure class" and at the same time serves as an instrument of distinction from, and exclusion of, other (especially poorer) social classes. The idea of the emergence and "hardening" of a powerful upper class by the maintenance of specific institutions is extended and connected with the behavioral components in Veblen (1914) : within certain general institutional features of the industrial ("machine industry") age (in particular, the maintenance of the institution of property law which originally emerged in connection with a handicrafts-oriented economic order), predatory behavior dominates in the "business class" constituted by owners and managers whereas the creative element, in continuity with the old era of handicrafts, tends to rest with workmen but is continuously being constrained ("contaminated") by the interests of the business class.
24 From this structure a key impediment to technological progress follows: with the leisure class / business class generally regarding innovative activity as a vulgarity, 25 the dominance of the predatory instinct drives a wedge between the interests of the broad community and the business class; this can happen, for example, by over-stressing pure marketing strategies (to use modern terminology here) to the detriment of "productive" technological development.
The "old" institutionalist school extended this key notion, in particular, by the concept of the "ceremonial encapsulation" of technological progress maintained by institutional surroundings serving powerful interests, the chief example being the modern industrial enterprise; 26 this perspective thus finds itself in complete contrast with Schumpeter's (1942) concept.
d) Which conclusions can we draw from these approaches with regard to a generalized evolutionary perspective on the relation between social stratification and technological change? A fundamental common feature of the approaches, albeit not always explicit, is to posit an interdependent relation between individual capabilities and agency patterns on the one hand and social structures, e.g. institutional surroundings or habits of "established" social classes, on the other. However, Schumpeter (1912) and Hayek set the emphasis in a quite different way to Veblen: Schumpeter focuses on a minority of pioneers in a personality-centered, and explicitly elitist, way; put crudely, the role of structural impediments consists merely of being overcome by this minority. In general, and somewhat analogously to mainstream economic distribution theory, social inequality appears as a result of individual differences. In contrast, Veblen and, following him, the "old" institutionalist school, without denying the possibility of individual social ascent, stress the role of institutional surroundings that, intimately linked to patterns of social stratification, decisively affect technological progress.
Furthermore, at least indirectly both Schumpeter and Veblen offer assertions on the relation between power structures and the speed of technological change. The Veblenian school sees a clear connection between "institutional sclerosis" and a retardation of technological progress; in consequence, a speeding up (which is principally assumed to serve community interests) ultimately can only be achieved by a weakening of established hierarchical structures, in particular, the modern business enterprise. 27 In contrast, Schumpeter (1942) regards the existence of large enterprises as a crucial precondition for the maintenance and, eventually, acceleration of technological progress. A commonality of Hayek and Veblen is the assumption of the existence of group selection processes, with institutions conceived as systems of rules being the units of selection. A relation can therefore be established between processes of "internal" and "external" selection regarding those units: in terms of external selection, an institutional system will only be viable if it can react flexibly to changes of surroundings by being able to generate novelty in a general sense; this in turn depends on the ways it is able to admit and accomodate processes of "creative destruction" (Schumpeter) ; to establish a framework of rules for "competition as a discovery procedure" (Hayek) ; or to stabilize an institutional framework that allows for individuals' "insticts of workmanship" to be canalized into socially productive behaviour (Veblen) .
3. Social power as an integrative concept of an evolutionary theory of social stratification a) Why power? Having reviewed some important ideas of the older authors, we now want to sketch core elements of a possible evolutionary synthesis. As a key concept, in this section we introduce a notion of social power which is roughly perceived as the capability to control social surroundings; it serves as an integrating link between social stratification and social mobility on the one hand and the generation of novelty on the other. Within the economics discipline, the notion of power up to now remains more or less marginalized, the only exception being some heterdox fields such as the mentioned "old" Institutionalist School and the Marxist-inspired Radical Economics. 28 We posit two main arguments for a (re-)introduction of power into economic analysis. First, neoclassical theories of income distribution are in general static by nature and therefore only able to take into account institutional and technological change as an exogenous modification of certain parameters in the usual comparative-static analysis. Thus, income distribution as the usual economic criterion of social stratification, while certainly serving as an indicator, is only of limited value for an evolutionary analysis; its central criterion of inequality should instead be directly linked to the ability to change social positions by generating novelty. The notion of power, defined as the controllability of social surroundings, can satisfy such a criterion because powerful positions include the potential to influence (that is, either foster or impede) the generation of novelty.
The second argument relates to the principal character of the competition for power as a quest for relative social standing, that is, for a commodity that can meaningfully be defined only as a position towards other agents: the existence of a powerful agent presupposes there to be an agent, or agents, subordinated to that power. 29 We can therefore draw a structural analogy to the competition for status and prestige which has recently attracted some attention from neoclassically inspired economics; however, the thrust of this branch of research seems to be less directed towards distributional issues as such than to the implications of status-27 ... and, eventually, its replacement by a "Soviet of Technicians", reflecting the late Veblen's view that engineers are the key carriers of the instinct of workmanship in modern societies (Veblen 1921 (Veblen /1963 (Veblen /1983 . 28 Important contributions outside those fields are e.g. Böhm-Bawerk 1914 , Stützel 1952 /1972 , Schneider/Watrin 1973 , Bartlett 1989 , Gustafsson 1991 , Takata 1995 . The only author systematically employing notions of power in the context of evolutionary economics is, to my knowledge, Herrmann-Pillath, see e.g. 2000 and 2002. 29 We take up the issue whether power can be regarded as a non-augmentable commodity further below.
oriented preferences for economic growth. 30 The importance of power and status competition from an evolutionary point of view is that different fields of research strongly indicate its character as an anthropological constant; 31 its complete sublimation by cultural influences appears, if present at all, more as the exceptional case in comparative cultural and ethnological studies. 32 Probably the most immediate evidence of the significance of relative positions for human nature is furnished by neurophysiology as well as the psychological theory of reference groups; 33 on the cultural level we can e.g. cite the universality of sportive competition across cultures. 34 In a very broad sense it can be hypothesized that the quest for power is a behavioral consequence of processes of sexual selection that tend to favor positions of dominance and control. We cannot pursue that issue further here than pointing to the enormous complexity that competitive patterns for relative positions take in modern societies; this is e.g. reflected by the phenomenon of "status inconsistencies", that is, the (at least temporary) existence of powerful positions with low social status.
b) Categories of power in an evolutionary framework. We now try to develop an evolutionarily adapted concept of power, offering several classifications that progress in descending levels of abstraction. For reasons of space and complexity, we can only rudimentarily relate our discussion to the rich literature in sociology and political science.
aa)
On the most general level, we want to call "power" an actor's ability to control its natural and social 35 surroundings, that is, to influence other actors' selection environments. An "actor" in this context can be an individual or a social entity, where we want to call a "social entity" a social unit providing its members with a non-excludable ("club") good, with all members possessing knowledge about their membership. 35 In the following, the emphasis of our treatment will be on the social component of controllability, the prime reason being that our main interest rests with power as a positional commodity. Assigning, technically, a kind of "negative power" to the position of the subordinate, we can regard the competition for power as a zero-sum game, which of course does not preclude power differences to vary from system to system. Power as the ability to control natural surroundings, of course, does not exhibit the zero-sum-characteristic, that is, contrary to social control, technological control over the environment is, in a very broad sense, an augmentable good. This is the most evident relation between power and (technological) innovation. The connection to social power is discussed further below. 36 In the following we also assume these entities to be units of selection, without being able to discuss this assumption further; see for a summary of related arguments e.g. Hodgson 1993, 186 ff.; Aldrich 1999, 35 ff.; Herrmann-Pillath 2002 passim. then differentiate between internal power exerted within the entity, and external power, which characterises the amount of power held by the entity itself over other entities. 37 Finally, we define as an "élite" a minority (not necessarily an entity) of individuals being characterised by significant power differences towards the rest of the population in a given system. The notion of controllability in an evolutionary framework requires a comment on the principal indeterminacy of evolutionary outcomes in the context of continuous emergence of novelty. It is clear that from an ex-ante-perspective the distribution of power in the sense of "exact" predictions as to which processes can be controlled by which actor are impossible. This does not preclude the scientific observer, however, from analysing different scenarios where certain entities are assumed to be structurally unaffected by change over a certain period of time, and, building on this, distinguishing between different levels of power positions that will or will not be affected by those changes. For example, changes in market structures will affect the power position held by an involved firm but usually not the power structure of the political entity at least in a limited time span. Power in the evolutionary sense is thus, like all other evolutionary concepts, inevitably a time-related notion. Our main point here is that despite its indeterminacy, a concept of differential controllability is an apt criterion of social stratification from the evolutionary point of view since it can establish a link between social inequality and patterns of change over time.
bb)
As a second step, we define as social power the relative potential held by a powerful actor to change the consequences of a subordinate's decisions for the subordinate's "assets", where we roughly classify those assets into financial, real, human, and social capital. Human capital is here understood very broadly as an individual's inherited or acquired traits potentially relevant in social selection, including all kinds of (potentially functional) individual knowledge. Power itself as the potential to impact on other actors constitutes a special part of a powerful actor's social capital, with social capital being seen here as a general potential to transact with other actors. Power is therefore partly a self-referential phenomenon; it includes the potential to influence the extent to which the different classes of an actor's assets can be transformed into power. 38 We stress the impact potential as "relative" because the possibility of influencing each other's assets in a pair of actors is normally mutual; the amount of power in the relation is then seen as a "balance" between those two potentials. Power is thus a measure of asymmetric social interdependency.
The concept of power employed here is considerably more general than the famous Weberian (1921) definition which presupposes the powerful actor's ability to force her will against the subordinated, or definitions that regard the restriction of choice sets of the subordinate as the central feature. 39 The ability to affect subordinates' assets includes, for example, the possibility to enlarge their choice sets, or to influence their preferences ("value power" 40 ).
cc) We now define a "power structure" as a set of asymmetrical social relationships within an entity that are established according to certain selection criteria 41 and exhibit stability over time. Accordingly we can distinguish between structural power and the power to change structures, that is, the power to change the relationship patterns themselves. The differentiation of these types then depends on which level of the hierarchy of social entities we are regarding. For example, the power to change the organisational buildup of a firm clearly constitutes structure-changing power on the level of that entity but not on the level of a political entity, viewed as holding competencies to establish formal institutions such as corporate law or competition law. In this example, we can also call the power exerted on the firm level power conforming to institutions and, accordingly, view institution-changing power as a key characteristic of the political realm.
42 dd) Finally, we distinguish between hierarchical and non-hierarchical power, where hierarchical power is characterised by the potential to directly control the actions of the subordinate. An organisation is then a particular kind of hierarchy characterised by independence of the hierarchical position from the individual holding the corresponding power.
ee) Before developing a general framework for the evolution of power structures, we have to add some general remarks on the essential relationship between power and individual knowledge. First, due to systemic indeterminacy there is by necessity a fundamental wedge of uncertainty between power as potential and its realisation. Institutions and hierarchies, then, can essentially be seen as a device to reduce that uncertainty by routinizing sanctions to non-compliance, stabilizing 39 A "restriction" of choice sets usually reflects a commitment of the holder of power to use his impact potential on the subordinate in a particular way (e.g. punishment) in case the subordinate does not comply; but that (apart from the extreme case of physical restriction, e.g. incarceration) does not in principle prevent the subordinate from non-compliance (e.g. by leaving the employment relationship). Power in our sense is then a measure of the asymmetric potential of this pair of actors to harm each other, for which their respective hierarchical positions are just one determinant among others; see our discussion of hierarchical power below dd) and ee). 40 Bartlett 1989 . 41 We develop this point more specifically in Section 4a. 42 The second decisive characteristic of political power is the ability to enforce formal rules fettered by the monopoly to use physical force.
expectations and internalizing certain behavioral patterns, thereby creating (explicit or implicit) common knowledge about the stability of asymmetric interdependencies. The situation is much more difficult, of course, if such common knowledge does not exist. We posit that power as a structure of social interdependence as such does not depend on concerned actors' knowledge about this structure in the sense that they can intentionally adapt their decisions to its existence; particularly in complex modern societies there are many asymmetrically interdependent relationships that actors (and, possibly, also the exante-observer, see for this problem above) are unaware of (but can eventually realize). On the other hand, it is evident that the amount of power in a social relationship or structure can crucially depend on constellations of actors' subjective knowledge about that structure: for example, the supplier of a good will be more powerful against a buyer not knowing about existing alternatives than against one being equipped with that knowledge. 43 Given the decentralized dispersion of knowledge in every social system, power is therefore by necessity influenced by knowledge differences and therefore never determined by formal social positions, in particular hierarchies, alone. This is, for example, the essence of the principal-agent-problem (albeit the game-theoretic literature normally employs another terminology): here the given asymmetric interdependence might favor the agent to the extent that she would then be the holder of power. 44 The extent to which knowledge (or certain kinds of knowledge) is transformed into power is then a function of the social structure in the regarded entity and therefore submitted to structure-changing power itself; we now turn to this relationship by developing a dynamic perspective.
Power and innovation in evolutionary perspective
a) Power and multi-level evolution. In order to connect our concept of power with a general framework of societal (emphasizing economic) evolution, we have to introduce the familiar notions of variation, selection and retention into our framework. To make our argument as straightforward as possible, we start by regarding a social entity (say, a firm) that is exclusively hierarchically organised. The hierarchical structure then defines internal selection criteria for thenecessarily scarce -resource of power: each position requires a certain combination of assets and "selects" those combinations from the pool of individuals belonging to the entity. 45 But, since hierarchical power includes (to the 43 See for an elaboration of this point Herrmann-Pillath 2002, 376 ff. 44 See for an interesting discussion of the possible tradeoff between maximization of power and aspiring to high hierarchical ranks Braham/Härmälä 2002, 171 f. 45 This formulation should not conceal the fact that, at least in the hierarchical case, selection for power is exclusively a function of deliberate decisions drawn by individuals. The structure of "selection criteria" will therefore be inevitably connected to subjective and psychological factors. extent limited by hierarchically higher entities, e.g. the law-making state) the power to change the hierarchical structure, it includes the ability to change (or, in the usual indeterminate setting, an overproportional influence on) selection criteria for power themselves: the power acquired by certain criteria includes the power to change those criteria and thereby change the power positions of the subordinated actors in the hierarchy, that is, the value of their assets for power competition. Over time, the system thus exhibits a characteristic interaction between a population being subjected to selection in a certain environment, and that environment itself; 46 we can call this interaction "heterarchical" (following Herrmann-Pillath 2002, 245) . As an additional feature, the size of the population competing for power is itself endogenously affected by powerful actors, e.g. by recruiting activities on the labor market. The retention mechanism is then constituted by the structural stability of the entity ascribing power to the selected assets over an adaptively significant period of time. The next step is then to regard the interplay between internal and external selection criteria. While we cannot deal here with the exact definition and circumscription of supra-individual intangible assets such as the "organisational capability" of a firm, we note that the extent to which the structure of the firm's internal selection criteria for power will determine its power on the next higher level of selection (where it competes within a population of other firms) will again depend on the criteria heterarchically defined within that higher-level entity. 47 To that extent, then, the internal power selection criteria of the firm also determine the external power of its members. The extent to which internal and external criteria can diverge (in analogy to the well-known potential conflict between natural and sexual selection) will depend on the degree of external selection pressure and the relative speed by which the external criteria change (viz., are changed by the entities' powerful protagonists, e.g. large firms) compared to the internal criteria. To give an extreme example, within a small enterprise the criteria for obtaining powerful positions might be arbitrarily decided by a single ownerdirector (for instance, he might only choose people belonging to his family, thus rendering the asset of kinship as chief criterion, but change those criteria at any time). The extent to which this structure is viable then depends on external selection pressure, that is, for example, the firm's position in the market. The analysis is more complex when we generalize our account to nonhierarchical power structures. We take the case of expert knowledge as a chief example of a possible discrepancy between hierarchical and non-hierarchical However, we follow evolutionary theory by judging decisions by their (adaptive) consequences, not intentions (see e.g. Aldrich 1999, 336) ; therefore the stability of selection criteria ultimately will become a subject of selection itself, given our context of multi-level selection. 46 Our approach is therefore not intended to be "structuralist" in the narrow sense but emphasizes the interaction between structure and agency (see also the preceding footnote). 47 We deal with the conceptual integration of inter-firm competition further below, see 4b.
power in firms. Here, the relation between internal and external selection is particularly close because the internal power of an "expert" crucially rests on the functionality of her private knowledge in the context of external selection; the expert's impact on internal criteria might then be indirect (such as by influencing promotion policies via the holder of the respective hierarchical position) or direct (e.g. by choosing with which other agents to share parts of his knowledge within an apprenticeship relation). In line with our above argument, 48 intentional agency or knowledge about a power position does not constitute a necessary precondition for the existence of structure-changing power. The expert may hold no or very limited knowledge about her influence on internal selection criteria; or her position may change without her acting deliberately at all, for example by a modification of external selection criteria.
b) Emergence of novelty and the evolution of power structures.
Having outlined a conception of selection and retention related to the evolution of power structures, we now take a closer look at variation.
aa)
Innovation and the emergence of novelty is, of course, a highly complex and multi-faceted process and can in principle, as we already mentioned, occur on all levels of selection. To make our argument simpler, we start by assuming that novelty arises from innovative ("creative") acts of individuals 49 that at first enlarge individuals' (private) knowledge, that is, their human capital, and we restrict ourselves to regarding innovations within firms. The connection to our conception of power competition is immediate: the innovator's position is determined by the transformability of his incremental asset, that is, novel private knowledge, into power, which is in turn overproportionately influenced by the structure changing power of other individuals within this entity who affect the adaptation of the hitherto criteria to the new asset. Conversely, of course, novelty, in the usual interplay between internal and external selection, affects the existing structure of power, be it, for instance, via changing the value of human capital by technological innovation or of social capital by organizational innovation. So, in this simplified framework, the emergence of novelty represents a special case of the described "heterarchical" interrelationship. The interplay of external and internal selection poses problems analogous to the general case. A major case of a possible contradiction between internal and external selection is given when an élite within an entity is primarily concerned with the preservation of internal power and therefore tries to block all kinds of innovation that could harm its own position. In plain terms, we can therefore reformulate the institutionalist problem of "encapsulation" as a tradeoff between internal and external power 50 that is influenced by the mentioned processual characteristics as well as, possibly, by the time horizons of the holders of power. We posit two main points relating the stream of innovations within an entity to its power structure. The first is, as outlined, the readiness of an élite to give up parts of its internal power in favor of gains in external power that may eventually be highly uncertain. The second concerns the excludability of the innovator's knowledge; this will be partly determined within the firm's hierarchy, partly an institutional feature externally given to the firm but of course highly relevant for the innovator's power position. Both points pose potential incentive problems for innovators within firms that directly lead to the constellation that Schumpeter (1912) mainly seems to have had in mind: the innovator uses his knowledge for the establishment of a new firm.
bb) The emergence of new firms / organisations is a class of novelty no longer controllable and analyzable on the level of a given firm's internal power structure; the perspective therefore shifts to the level of competition among a population of enterprises. Analogously to the intra-firm perspective, selection takes place under certain criteria for the acquisition of power that are again overproportionately affected by "élite" actors such as large firms strategically influencing a political authority's law-making activities. In further analogy, the size and variety of the population of competing firms is endogenously determined, e.g. by the imposition of minimal requirements for establishing an enterprise. However, we note two major differences of this level of selection compared to intra-firm power competition: first, power relationships, at least in a market economy, will primarily be non-hierarchical; 51 second, the power of a firm necessarily has to be judged not only by its position against other firms but against consumers. There are two main ways in which a firm can exert power over consumers: the first is monopoly power (by rendering the consequences of consumers' decisions not to buy at the monopolist for their assets more severe) and the second value power (by influencing consumers' preferences; interestingly, this factor is emphasized not only by the Veblenian school but also by Schumpeter). Reversely, consumers can obviously exert power over producers if they organise into some kind of entity such as associations; to the extent of market demand the association represents, it will have the potential to affect firms' selection environments and therefore in the context of power competition hold a position similar to that of other firms. Frequently, however, decentralized processes, such as frequencydependent "herd effects" in the formation of preferences, are more characteristic for the demand side. This would then, in our framework, have to be regarded as a spontaneous process of self-organization and constitute a novelty not controllable on the level of entrepreneurial competition.
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In sum, the impact of power on the evolution of selection criteria for power positions and the stability of these criteria over time are the result of a complex interplay between firms' and consumers' behavior. Ultimately, the functionality of the resulting structural features can only be judged from the next higher level of selection which, in our simplified case, would be constituted by the "competition of jurisdictions" and thereby lead into the realm of economic policy, which we cannot pursue at this point.
Social mobility
Having developped a -necessarily rough and simplified -framework for the evolution of power structures, we now proceed by combining this framework with the phenomenon of social mobility. First, we stress that, in contrast to the main economic and sociological literature, 53 we explicitly relate our criterion of social mobility to power as a stratification criterion. Social "ascent" or "descent" is then defined as gain or loss in power. We follow the main literature, however, in restricting our concept of social mobility to individuals; the ascent or descent of enterprises is therefore only regarded under the perspective of changes in individuals' (external) power positions. We essentially defined the competition for power as a valuation of assets unequally distributed in a given population, taking place in the framework of a selection process. Therefore, we have to relate the evolution of the pool of assets in our population to the evolution of power structures in that population. 54 The interdependency is clear: on the one hand, our very definition of power was an actor's potential to affect the assets of a subordinate; on the other hand, the availability, and scarcity, of certain assets feeds back on the evolution of power structures. In essence, then, patterns of social mobility can be regarded as results of coordination processes harmonizing the inherently different speeds of evolution ("Eigen-times") of different classes of assets on the one hand, and different levels of power structures on the other hand within a given population.
To clarify this abstract relationship, we start by drawing a simple distinction between assets that are genetically determined and/or individually unchangeable, 55 and assets that are acquired and/or continuously changed by social interaction. To take an example, let us regard a social entity (a state) whose selection criteria for power solely relate to kinship (reign of a heritable aristocracy), that is, a genetically determined property, with those criteria exhibiting very high stability over generations (due to cultural or religious reasons). The evolution speed of the asset pool is then determined biologically and demographically whereas the evolution speed of power structures is determined culturally and, in this case, is slower than the asset pool. The coordination problem becomes evident if, for example, the birth rate of the aristocracy is too low to fill up the (structurally predetermined) power positions. The necessary adaptive process will, similarly to our general framework, be influenced by external selection pressure (such as the threat of conquest by neighboring states), and possibly result into the emergence of organisational novelty reconciling the long-term cultural entrenchment of the power structure with the changed demographic conditions (e.g. rules for temporary rights of representation). The result, then, is directly associated with a certain pattern of social mobility (ascent of non-aristocrats into power positions).
Regarding the general case of power structures selecting for both fixed and socially acquired assets, we receive a highly complex interrelationship between the evolution of various classes of assets and of the power structure which in turn is reconnected to asset evolution at differing intensities. Since the evolution of different categories of human capital will play a decisive role in our analysis of the knowledge society, we try, in necessary crudeness, to highlight some major connections. Starting again at the lowest evolution speed, the inherent genetical limits of human mental capacity have to be taken into account; these traits can therefore (save for fundamental technological and institutional change that allows for eugenic measures) taken as constant parameters of societal evolution. On the next level we would have to distinguish mental capacities and capabilities that are primarily shaped by childhood development and parental education. Here an evolutionary analysis would have to integrate long-term cultural factors such as changes in family structures or educational styles; the responsivity to power structure requirements will under normal circumstances be highly inert. Another class of human capital assets, being much more familiar to economists, is the capacities and knowledge acquired in educational systems; here, the interaction with the evolution of power structures becomes substantial not only by the connection between the analysis of social mobility and structural aspects of the evolution of corporations is explicitly advocated, see Carroll/Hannan 2000, 424. 55 We relate here to kinship (see the example below in this section) and to properties whose phenotypic expression is exclusively or to a great part determined by genetic endowments given a normal range of environmental conditions (e.g. nutrition). The question whether certain educational system creating scarcities and superfluencies of certain assets but also by channels of (e.g., economic) power influencing the development and emphases of education. 56 As a final category, we can note capabilites that are acquired directly in the context of learning in organisations; here the connection to the evolution of power structures is closest and most evident.
6. Power and social mobility in the "knowledge society": a scenario
Having developed a general theoretical framework for the connection of the evolution of power structures, the emergence of novelty, and social mobility, we now want to outline a possible application to the current emergence of "knowledge societies" in some advanced economies. Our chief aim is to develop a scenario (ultimately, an empirically testable hypothesis) in which, contrary to the (explicit or implicit) ideas of the older authors, an acceleration in the rate of technological progress is integrally connected to a fall in social mobility, that is, in a stabilization of social inequality. Given the space constraints (and the preliminary character of the author's research on this point), our discussion will not delve into empirical detail but remains constrained to some general structural features, putting its main focus on the U.S. economy. Our argument is organised along the theoretical exposition: we first outline some general structural features that distinguish knowledge societies from industrial societies and second connect them to key developments in the pool of individual assets. a) Key structural features of knowledge societies. Starting from a macro-oriented perspective, a central feature of technological change in knowledge societies is that it lowers the economic significance of natural resources and raises the importance of qualitative improvements of factors of production, in particular the "brain-empowerment" of human capital. Not only are the relative shares of GDP attributable to intangible capital, and with it the relative importance of the tertiary sector, rising, but industries in the primary and secondary sectors also tend to become more knowledge-intense. 57 This is reflected by steeply rising investment rates into the production and dissemination of knowledge (training, education, R&D, information and coordination). 58 Rapid improvements in transport and communication technologies extend the geographical scope of competition both within and between organisations; the general trend in politial-institutional environments towards economic liberalisation (e.g. privatisation, deregulation of characterial traits and mental capacity, in particular analytical intelligence, are also subsumable under this category, is controversial; we will discuss some results in section 6. 56 Coordination problems of this kind appear e.g. in the literature about "national systems of innovation"(see for a good summary Freedman 1995) , with the aspect of social stratification and social mobility, however, regularly being ignored. 57 See e.g. Neef 1996, 2. international trade) tends to reinforce competitive pressure. One consequence of these trends are the well-known processes of "oursourcing" that in industrialized countries tend to raise the importance of knowledge and innovation further; the "need to innovate" is thus closer and closer tied to economic survival 59 and knowledge differences become a primary criterion of social stratification.
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Shifting to a more microeconomically oriented perspective, an important factor is the lack of excludability of knowledge as an economic good; therefore the competitive advantage (and, in our terminology, power) achieved by an innovation, absent a very strict institutional framework of property rights, tends to evaporate quickly, a trend which is reinforced by a loss of significance of economies of scale and rising possibilities of market entrance and imitation. 61 A key structural characteristic of knowledge societies is the trend towards increasing complexity, with far-reaching consequences not only for the economic system as a whole but also for the intra-organisational level: On the level of production processes, required human capabilities gradually move away from manual-sensory activities to coordination and the control of abstract procedures. In general, the ability to recognize concrete patterns building on experience decreases in importance, being replaced by the capacity to understand abstract models 62 -a process famously deemed as the "rise of the symbolic worker" by Reich 1991. On the level of organisational coordination and communication, as a general trend hierarchical power loses in importance, a development exacerbated by mounting external pressure for organisational flexibility and adaptability. 63 Concurrently, non-hierarchical asymmetries gain in significance that are increasingly based on abstract cognitive capabilities such as, again, the ability to coordinate abstract procedures but also the capacity to quickly acquire new knowledge, and to flexibly and creatively adapt to fast-changing surroundings.
A common denominator of all these developments is that they foster, and are interconnected with, an increasing speed of technological progress and thereby structural change. Concomitantly, selection criteria for power shift in favor of human capital in general and assets that are positively correlated with the potential to generate innovations in particular. b) Evolution of the asset pool. Building on our assertion that human capital as an asset becomes more important as a power criterion in knowledge societies, we concentrate our -necessarily rough -discussion on the evolution of different 58 David /Foray 2001, 1. 59 Ibid., 2. 60 Stehr 1999. 61 See Stehr 2001, 66 ff. 62 Hunt 1995 exemplifies this impressively by the development of military technology (200 ff.). 63 Röpke introduced the concept of the "novelty-prone organisation" ("neuerungsfreudige Organisation") already in 1977, see Röpke 1977, 224 ff. and for a good summarizing treatment Reich 1991. categories of human capital. We build on the differentiation drawn in section 5 but now, in order to receive conclusions with regard to social mobility in knowledge societies, put our stress on the distribution of these assets and its change over time.
aa) On the level of assets determined genetically and/or in early childhood, the question becomes relevant if, and to what extent, the unequal distribution of cognitive capacity and other relevant psychological traits, in particular, creativity, is unaffected by environmental variation within a normal range. We enter here the complex realm of behavioral genetics and the psychology of individual differences and can only highlight some major points. 64 Our main focus is on the issue of genetically determined cognitive capacity / "intelligence" since this question has been most extensively discussed in relation to problems of social stratification. 65 To establish that such a relation exists and that it is indeed significant, we have to examine two main questions: first, to what extent intelligence is hereditary and/or genetically fixed over the human life span; second, whether the concept of intelligence used in psychological research is sufficiently closely related to the shift of power selection criteria relevant for knowledge societies.
As to the first question, psychological research on the heredity of intelligence has been mainly focussed on the concept of the intelligence quotient (IQ). IQ scores are obtained from some standard tests of analytic, verbal, and spatial skills.
66 Notably, since it is explicitly designed to measure individual differences, the IQ is a relative value related to a certain population, an IQ of 100 indicating the arithmetic mean of normalized test results. 67 Based on this technique and a spate of twin and adoption studies, there exists by now a fairly 64 The issue of genetic influences on core human capabilities virtually disappeared from the agenda of social sciences after World War II and was largely replaced by "tabula rasa"-conceptions of human nature. Only from the 1970's, it was reluctantly taken up again in the framework of the "sociobiology debate". By now, the genetical/anthropological base of at least some basic dispositions of human behavior seems to be uncontested, see e.g. Voland 2000 or Bjorklund/Pellegrini 2001. However, evolutionary psychology and sociobiology up to now have not addressed individual differences and their possible genetic origins (Bjorklund/Pellegrini 2001, 76 ff.) , which is however the mainly relevant perspective for our question about the determinants of the dynamics of social stratification. Individual differences are a core topic in behavioral genetics (see for a summary of main issues and results Plomin/Colledge 2001) which also seems to increasingly emphasise the role of genetic predispositions (e.g. Plomin/Caspi 1998). The position taken in this paper is that while results in those fields are still somewhat ambiguous and (not surprisingly) contested, the general evidence that broad classes of socially relevant human characteristics and abilities are systematically affected by individual variations in genotypes seems to be strong enough by now to be theoretically taken into account by social scientists. Our discussion of the intelligence question is of course only exemplary, and necessarily rudimentary. 65 This discussion up to now has been almost exclusively confined to the U.S.; it was mainly set off by Herrnstein/Murray's "Bell Curve" (1994) . See for the ensuing academic debate Fischer et al. 1996 , Arrow et al. 2000 See for a good summary Aiken 1987. 67 See e.g. Fischer et al. 1996, 31 ff. broad agreement that given a normal range of environmental surroundings in industrial societies, intelligence exhibits a heritability factor of around 0,5. 68 A somewhat unresolved question, however, is the so-called "Flynn effect" which indicates a secular rise in IQ scores by about one standard deviation since World War II, necessitating continuous re-standardisations of tests. 69 In general, however, analogously e.g. to the variance in body heights, the effect might not contradict a genetic component of individual IQ differences but reflect environmental changes affecting all of the population, such as increased exposure to the mass media and computers. Another concern is the way in which cognitive capabilites might be affected in very early childhood, possibly already during pregnancy; 70 in general, results seem to be preliminary on this point. The view that intelligence as measured by IQ is to an important extent pretermined after early childhood at latest seems to be broadly agreed upon.
The second question mainly concerns the psychological debate on the existence and significance of a "general factor of intelligence" (g). 71 Proponents of g assert the existence of a certain limited number of core mental abilities that can be hierarchically grouped around a common factor g. 72 IQ tests are assumed to be highly "g-loaded" and thus serve as a good predictor for a wide range of individual cognitive capabilites such as computing power, the processing speed of information, thinking in abstract categories, and the ability to successfully handle complexity. As a consequence, the g-perspective draws a clear and unambiguous connection between individual differences in g and key indicators of social stratification such as scholastic performance, intellectual attainment, occupational status, job performance, income, and even law abidingness. 73 Skeptics of the approach advocate different alternatives. The most radical approach is the assertion of principally different components of human ability ("multiple intelligences") 74 whose correlation is empirically not validated. 75 A related branch advocates conceptions of "successful intelligence" that include a broad array of capabilites necessary to function in specific socio-cultural environments; notably, Sternberg 1985 , implicitly relating to modern working environments, names the ability to handle complexity and adapt flexibly to novelty as a central feature of his intelligence notion. Cognitive psychology principally distinguishes between "crystallized" (I c ) and "fluid" (I f ) intelligence where I c at a certain time t, roughly described as a problem-solving capacity derived from accumulated experience, is 68 See for an authoritative summary Neisser et al. 1996. 69 Without of course being able to decide psychological controversies, we can draw two conclusions: first, the main conceptions of intelligence used in the psychological literature, whether deriving from psychometrics or alternative approaches, appear to be highly relevant as power selection criteria in our structural scenario of knowledge societies. Second, even if we do not follow the psychometric approach in postulating g, the core categories of the basic intelligence conceptions seem to be close enough to relate them to the hereditary components discussed before. 78 In principle, therefore, the fact that cognitive capacity is partly inherited is likely to influence social stratification in knowledge societies at least in the longer run.
bb) Shifting our focus to the level of assets exhibiting higher evolution speeds, we can only give some brief remarks on key characteristics of the evolution of educational systems, focussing again on the U.S. We identify two major trends. First, the period of educational reform between the 1950's and 1970's allowed a significantly higher share of the population to gain degrees in higher education. Concurrently, the higher ranks of the workforce became substantially better educated: one the one hand, given structural change towards the "knowledge society", educational minimum requirements for leading positions increased considerably; on the other hand, educational systems became more successful in screening the population's cognitively gifted for adequate intellectual challenge.
As an example, the share of American chief executives holding graduate degrees rose substantially from the 1950ies 79 and management education approximately from the same period on became increasingly "scientified", particularly by the introduction of MBA programmes.
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The second trend is an increasing vertical differentiation of universities, a trend particularly pronounced at the upper end of American élite universities. Interestingly, the increasing inequality in educational standards seems to exhibit two distinct aspects: on the one hand, it appears probable that since the beginning of the 1980's at latest, stratification of educational opportunity along parental 76 See e.g. Hunt 1995 and Hunt 1997. 77 See for a good summary of research results Sternberg / O'Hara 1999. 78 In fact, neither the cognitive nor Sternberg's approach doubt a hereditary component of intelligence as measured by IQ testing (see Hunt 1997; Sternberg 2002) ; they only question the significance of this result for broader classes of human capabilities. 79 Herrnstein/Murray 1994, 59. socio-economic status has been on the rise again 81 (although it is somewhat doubtful that even the preceding educational expansion had significant equalization effects). 82 On the other hand, "cognitive stratification", measured e.g.
by minimum required scores in standardized tests of aptitude, or, of course, by research output, has become a significant feature of the American university structure; up to the 1960ies, entrance criteria for places like Harvard or Yale had been primarily oriented at membership of certain prestigeous societal circles.
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c) The scenario. What can we conclude from a perspective on the co-evolution on structures and asset pools in knowledge societies? We outlined the increasing speed of technological and institutional change as a key structural characteristic of knowledge societies. Connecting this to the development of educational systems, we encounter an issue contested among economic historians: namely whether the structural shift towards "knowledge societies" was the consequence of educational expansion (by new entrants to the workforce systematically redesigning their working environments) or its cause (by educational policies being redesigned to meet increased demand for brain power on labor markets). 84 Within our framework of a "heterarchical" relationship between powerful agents and the power structure, we regard an interconnected development as most plausible; nevertheless, we presume that the evolution speed of power structures will generally tend to be higher than the speed of the educational system, implying in particular that the availibilty of trained specialists will be a limiting factor in structural development. On the other hand, given the patterns of vertical differentiation particularly in the university system, we can assume that the educational system will select, and educate, people relatively efficiently in certain core competencies that are substantially related to structural requirements such as flexibility, creativity, and the ability to quickly acquire new knowledge. Thus, "social mobility" in the educational system will substantially correlate with the frequency of social ascent into or descent from powerful positions. Given the outlined structural characteristics, then, social mobility in knowledge societies is determined by two principal factors: first, inequality in the distribution of (parental) power and income as influencing childrens' educational opportunity; 80 Nelson 1995, 18 f. 81 Fischer et al. 1996, 152 ff. 82 Compare for a comprehensive international study Shavit/Blossfeld 1993. 83 Herrnstein/Murray 1994, 37 ff. A similar development seems to have taken place in France and Great Britain; see for a comparison of the French, British and German university systems in the context of élite selection Hartmann 2001. Interestingly, this study, while acknowledging the difficulty of entrance examinations to universities such as the ENA or Oxford, seems to regard the inequal distribution of Bourdieuan "cultural capital" as the sole explanatory factor for increasing inequality. While our scenario does of course not exclude these factors, they are from our point of view very unlikely to be able to explain the whole variance in examination results, given the outlined psychological findings. 84 See e.g. Stehr 2001, 288. second, inequality of the distribution of general cognitive capacity as determined genetically and in early childhood. Given that those stratification criteria are, as a result of the opening up of educational opportunity, at least weakly interrelated, the result will an intellectual, educational, and structural "runaway process" in which the speed of structural change and the specific assets of a selected élite will reinforce each other. This process is then integrally connected to a decrease in social mobility; to paraphrase Witt's (1987) remark (comp. ref. 20) , it will then indeed be the same minority of entrepreneurial individuals that is propelling change over and over again. To conclude, let us briefly relate this scenario to the outlined ideas of the evolutionary "classics". Our scenario contrasts Hayek's ideal of a "Great Society" resting on spontaneous market order insofar as the coincidental character of social ascent and descent is to an important extent replaced by a stable stratification of core cognitive assets; importantly, the "hardening" of the social structure here does not prevent the external adaptability of the economic system but is a precondition for its survival. The difference to Schumpeter's (1912) conception is that the entrepreneurial abilities on which social ascent is based are a priori unequally distributed in the population, largely preventing technological change to cause significant movements between social classes. Contrary to Schumpeter (1942) we do not assume that an acceleration of innovative activity is only possible within monopolist structures and/or large enterprises; while we do presume the existence of significant, and rising, power differentials, we see a weakening of hierarchical and centralized power structures in knowledge societies. Finally, we do not concur to Veblen's (1914) perspective of a "business class" "encapsulating" technological progress because we presume that mounting competitive pressure in the context of new technologies limits the viability of business organisations exhibiting selection criteria that block the diffusion of novelty.
Conclusion
The basic intent of the paper was to show the relevance of questions of social stratification and social mobility -which many economists still tend to relegate into the exclusive realm of sociology -to core problems of evolutionary economics, in particular, technological change. Addressing this theoretical gap, we suggested an evolutionary concept of social power as an integrating link beween the separated fields. Applying our framework to the emergence of knowledge societies, we obtained a scenario of accelerated change combined with decreasing social mobility that, although potentially putting the viability of knowledge-based economies as such in doubt, has not been addressed by hitherto research in evolutionary economics.
Given the complexity of the problems dealt with, our discussion at many points had to remain rudimentary and preliminary. As a conclusion, therefore, we briefly discuss some issues that from our point of view need further elaboration and could be fruitful avenues of future research. a) A disadvantage of using power as a stratification criterion is its problematic measurability, particularly in comparison with standard data of income distribution. There is, however, a large sociological literature on power measurement with a particular focus on decision processes in municipalities. Here, evolutionary economic analysis could establish a link by shifting the focus of distributional research, which traditionally emphasizes a highly aggregated macroeconomic perspective, more towards case studies, e.g. by investigating the relation of innovation generation, power structures and social mobility within firms or industries. In the same spirit, empirical studies of technological progress in knowledge societies would need to be closer connected to distributional issues particularly on a fairly disaggregated level. b) Our study did not discuss the role of political power in shaping the institutional surroundings of knowledge societies. Its complex interplay with economic power would certainly have to be taken into account, e.g. in the context of jurisdictional competition. c) Our analysis of human capital assets relevant in the context of knowledge societies necessarily had to remain rudimentary. The analysis of mainly cognitive factors needs to be complemented by a fuller account of characterial traits such as motivation or social skills. However, it appears unlikely that these factors are completely unrelated to cognitive capacity, be it due to genetics or to positive reinforcement effects during development. d) Finally, we only touched, but did not discuss, the evolution of legitimacy criteria and its possible interrelationships with the evolution of power structures. In this field, an interdisciplinary analysis appears particularly appropriate, e.g. by establishing links to cultural studies or modern theories of justice.
